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REVIEW ESSAY: STEPHEN CARTER AND
RELIGION IN AMERICA
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRVrAZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION. By Stephen L. Carter. New
York: Basic Books, 1993. Pp. 328. $25.00.
Reviewed by Thomas L. Shaffer*
Professor Carter dedicates his treatment of religion in American law
and (North) American society, The Culture of Disbelief,' to his chil-
dren-"who should be able to live in a world that respects your
choices instead of tolerating them." His book is a lengthy, widely
read, widely reviewed, 2 manifestly popular, and eloquent complaint.
Although most of what he subjects to analysis is aimed at power bro-
kers who either claim no faith or make sure that whatever faith they
have makes no difference, the most cutting part of his criticism is of
his fellow Christians in the mainline church. In each of these moods,
and in both of them, Professor Carter takes on the policy of toleration
that he hopes to protect his children from, as he also hopes for an
American society that is religiously pluralistic, in which religious
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Supervising
Attorney, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic; Member of the Indiana Bar. I am grateful for the
generous assistance of Gerald V. Bradley, Linda Harrington, Stanley Hauerwas, Dwight B.
King, Jr., Kristin Morgan-Tracy, John H. Robinson, Robert E. Rodes, Jr., NancyJ. Shaffer,
and John Howard Yoder.
1. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
2. These include the following (probably not an exhaustive list): Paul Reidinger,
Book Review, 79 A.B.A.J. 114 (1993); Chris Adams, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Oct.
3, 1993, at E7; Associated Press, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, at B4; Joan Beck, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 1993, at A15; Peter L. Berger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at 15; Michiko
Kakutani, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at C18; Michael C. Kenny, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31,
1993, at 46; Michael Kinsley, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, at 4; Jonathan Kirsch, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at E3; John Leo, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 20, 1993, at 20;
Robert Marquand, CHRISTLAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 15, 1993, at 13; Thomas Morawetz, WASH.
POST, Oct. 3, 1993, at X8; Howard Owens, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 18, 1993, at B5;
Kevin P. Quinn, AMERICA, Nov. 27, 1993, at 19; Gerald Renner, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov.
14, 1993, at G3; Peter Steinfels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, at 8; Chris Tucker, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 28, 1993, at J8; Larry Witham, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at B7;
Kenneth L. Woodward, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1993, at 56; Don Wycliff, COMMONWEAL, Oct.
8, 1993, at 22.
The Kakutani, Owens, Renner, and Steinfels reviews mention that President Clinton
recommended the book during his summer vacation at Martha's Vineyard, and again at a
prayer breakfast in Washington in the fall of 1993. See Kakutani, supra, at C18; Owens,
supra, at B5; Renner, supra, at G3; Steinfels, supra, at 8.
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groups are at least equal in influence to patriotic groups, veterans or-
ganizations, labor unions, and grass-roots political clubs.3
In the first and quantitatively minor part of his case, he notes that it
is the marginal religious groups-Jehovah Witnesses, Mormons,
Christian Scientists, Native American religions, and curious groups
that practice animal sacrifice-that suffer the personal and communal
burden of living in a culture of disbelief. Roman Catholics and the
mainline Protestant denominations suffer relatively little. They have
long offered their support to American public policy and have tacitly
accepted the proposition that religion is a hobby-all in return for a
system of payments under the table: "[I] magine the brouhaha if New
York City were to take St. Patrick's Cathedral by eminent domain to
build a new convention center, or if Kansas ... were to outlaw the
religious use of wine." 4
Mainline religion does not suffer because it has let itself become
civil religion. It goes with the flow. Mainline Christian support for
public policy is manifest in what Professor Carter calls "political
preaching," that is, the formulation of religious argument to support
political viewpoints5 that are arrived at outside the church. Thus, "the
will of God is not discerned by the faithful but created by them."6 Here
the activity is more than a "hobby," but it is not what the Jewish and
Christian traditions have usually called religious; what these political
preachers say fits too comfortably into what the civil society wants to
do at the moment.7 Although he does not expand the point, Carter
3. See also A Conversation with Stephen Carter, RELIGION AND VALUES IN PUBLIC LIFE, Fall
1993, at 1.
4. CARTER, supra note 1, at 9.
5. These political viewpoints are almost always those of whatever the dominant force
in American politics is at the moment.
6. CARTER, supra note 1, at 72. As Stanley Hauerwas puts it, more pointedly:
"Protestant liberal theology was . . . developed to solve problems in American
constitutional law," a matter, he says, of "religion domesticated by -Enlightenment
tolerance." STANLEY HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM 84 (1991). Such an ecclesiastical (or
ecclesiological) development has two consequences: (1) it encourages a political order in
which significant religious conviction is a matter of private opinion; and (2) it endorses
religious associations that support the state.
7. To speak of "religion" in this way is to discount the sense in which theology allows
traditional Judaism and Christianity to be spoken of as a religion. As John Howard Yoder
puts it in a memorandum on this review:
The lordship ofJHWH or ofJesus is not an alternative to other religions in
the genre religio. It is an alternative to other polities and deities .... The
point is not that activities are not hobbies because they are religious, but
that they are not hobbies because they respond to the command of the true
God.
Memorandum from John H. Yoder, Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame, to
Thomas L. Shaffer, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame (Dec. 9, 1993) [hereinafter
Yoder Memorandum] (on file with author).
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notices that political preaching is nowhere more evident than in main-
line religion's dependable support for lethal state violence: "[I]n its
grasping for power, the institutional church gave up the right to die
for its beliefs in exchange for the right to kill for its beliefs."8
I. FROM THE LAW SCHOOL
The aspect of Carter's case that focuses on the church is, I think,
the more important part of his book, and I will return to it, but it is
less prominent than what he wants to say about how religion is treated
by lawyers, law teachers, producers of television programs, and jour-
nalists-the public world he contemplates in this book, as he contem-
plated the Civil Rights Movement and its aftermath in his earlier,
popular Reflections of an Affirmative Action. Baby.9 His from-the-law-
school case against the "trivialization" of religion has within it two dis-
tinct, largely empirical, largely negative propositions, both of which
rest on a philosophical moral argument-the egalitarian, democratic-lib-
eral argument that it is discriminatory to suppress religion.
In America, assertions based on faith are discouraged, and they should not
be. They should be, as he tells his children, respected instead. They
should be allowed the light of day; they should be allowed, following
Richard John Neuhaus, a place in the public square. 10 It was wrong,
for example, for administrators in a public school to require a teacher
to wash the ashes from his forehead on Ash Wednesday, as it was
wrong to keep another teacher in another public school from reading
the Bible to herself during quiet moments in the classroom. These
public-school administrators would have allowed the first teacher to
wear a "save the whales" button and the second to read Das Kapital.
"[W] ith all the different reasoning methods that people use, it is only
the forms that are dictated by religious traditions that liberalism rules
out of bounds."i1
In America, assertions based on faith are given only as much attention (re-
spect) as assertions from nonreligious "interest groups," and they should be
given more attention than that. Following David Tracy,1 2 the most useful
thing religion has done for America, if only occasionally, is to resist,
and resistance is particularly important in American democracy.
"[R]eligions are at their most useful when they serve as democratic
intermediaries and preach resistance."1 3 Religious groups should be
8. CARTER, supra note 1, at 82.
9. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
10. RjctARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NmrED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984).
11. CARTER, supra note 1, at 218.
12. DAVID TRACv, PLURALITv AND AMBIUITVm HERMENEUTICS, RELICION, HOPE (1987).
13. CARTER, supra note 1, at 132.
1994] 1603
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
"accommodated," not because they are like the Elks or the Rotary
Club, but because they are particularly situated to notice and say that
the emperor is naked. They are
the obstacle around which state policy must make the widest
possible berth .... [They are] autonomous moral and political
forces . . . separate heads of sovereignty vital to preventing
majoritarian tyranny. Thus, the reason for accommodation be-
comes not the protection of individual conscience, but the pres-
ervation of religions as independent power bases that exist in
large part to resist the state. 14
Still, the arguments Carter makes are not, for the most part, argu-
ments about how power should be used; they are moral arguments,
addressed to people-believers mostly, because most Americans are
believers-who comfortably regard their own religion as a hobby, and
who are not comfortable talking about or listening to talk about reli-
gion. What is wrong with the way leaders in Louisiana receive a "scien-
tific creationist" is that his argument is not treated as worthy of
consideration. The unfairness he suffers is not clearly a legal prob-
lem-he need not fear an application of public force so long as all he
does is talk.' 5 Carter makes the moral argument that it is wrong for
the Creationist's neighbors to ignore him. What is wrong with disdain
for the position taken by leaders of the Roman Catholic Church on
abortion is that what they say is treated as beyond reasonable analysis
and therefore beyond civil consideration.
Carter spends a fair amount of space disapproving of recent First
Amendment decisions by the United States Supreme Court, notably
Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,16 but his argu-
ment, even there, is mostly a moral argument for giving organized
religion the space it needs to ask for shared sovereignty. He directs
most of his book more at modern American democratic attitudes than
at obstacles to religious faith or denials of access to public witness;
again, the argument is moral, not legal.
14. Id. at 134.
15. Carter here addresses talk as a moral matter. One could frame the moral
admonition as urging the civility with which one person should listen to another. Viewed
legally, talk is protected by freedom of speech; the law does not require anybody to listen.
Neither perspective is adequate theologically: Judaism and Christianity cannot be reduced
to talk. Neither Israel nor the Christian church is primarily an interest group, or an idea,
or an argument. Both are, first of all and primarily, peoples. See HAUERWAS, supra note 6, at
72, 175 n.3. Freedom of religion provides protection to such peoples-or, at any rate, that
is the theory of freedom of religion, which, from the point of view ofJudaism and of the
Christian church, may be a bad idea because it forces the alternatives suggested at note 5,
supra See Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of Christ, 42 DE PAUL L. lEv.
107 (1992).
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Carter argues for his moral position in two ways. He is, most of the
time, a modern American liberal-liberal in both usual senses of the
word: (1) He accepts the understanding of liberty and the dogma of
autonomy that educated Americans consciously inherit from the En-
lightenment;1 7 and (2) he is a pro-choice civil libertarian who votes
for Democrats. But once in a while he sounds like the Apostle Paul in
Athens, or any one of dozens of Rabbis in that hellenized world-a
believer who wears his faith on his sleeve, who appears and speaks in
the public square. I mean that Carter sometimes, or even mostly, ar-
gues as the member of the modern American intelligentsia that he is,
and that sometimes he argues as if the main thing he wants to say
publicly is that he is a believer. (He leaves no doubt, by the way, that
he is a believer, an active and devoted member of the Episcopal
Church.) These are different ways of claiming attention, and one
should look at them separately.
A. The Academic Liberal Speaking in Law School
Carter almost always formulates the first kind of argument as what I
call a philosophical moral argument. Such argument hardly ever has
any evident theology in it, although it could have. (For example,
Carter could, but does not, talk-as theologians do18 -of the political
theology in the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's letter to the church in
Rome.) Why should a modern American academic liberal, speaking
philosophically, care that religion in America has been turned into a
hobby? Carter has three answers. First, he should care because preva-
lent liberal attitudes toward religion put liberal control of America in
peril: "The roughly half of Americans for whom religious tradition is
very important in reaching moral decisions are, in the long run, likely
17. Carter defines liberal in this classical sense: "[Tihe philosophical tradition that
undergirds the Western ideal of political democracy and individual liberty." CARTER, supra
note 1, at 55. He would, I think, agree that the tradition advocates or results in a political
order that, ostensibly to preserve liberty, strives to be normatively neutral, so that both its
deliberation and its coercion is procedural. Both civic virtue and the state avoid
commitments; they are referees. Liberal societies also tend to discourage communities, or
at least to discourage communities that have influence over their members. An association
of people receives normative or coercive standing in the liberal political order because
recognizing the association is seen as consequent to the protection of individual liberty.
The result is a paradoxical civil order that tends to state tyranny and in which every person
is her own tyrant.
18. See OSCAR CULLMAN, THE STATE IN THE NEw TErSTAMENr (1956). A philosophical
argument, such as Carter's, reasons from or toward universals. Theological argument such
as St. Paul's in Romans is more likely to reason from and toward particular commitments in
particular communities. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY 67-87 (1988).
This was a talk that Hauerwas originally gave to a convocation of philosophers at Rice
University. He calls it "Reconciling the Practice of Reason: Casuistry in a Christian
Context."
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to turn their backs on a liberal tradition that turns its back on what
they cherish most."' 9
Second, he should care because the cultural practice of ignoring
religion belies the republican ideal of a community of mediating as-
sociations-what we old-fashioned Catholics used to call the principle
of subsidiarity. This argument reintroduces the shared-sovereignty
theme that Carter justifies with his argument that the church should
resist the government: Denial of respect for argument from religious
groups rests on the belief that all power should be in the state. The
attack on tax exemptions for religious organizations that oppose abor-
tion, for example,
is just another effort to ensure that intermediate institutions,
such as the religions, do not get in the way of government's will
. . . that only one vision of the meaning of reality-that of the
powerful group of individuals called the state-is allowed a
political role .... [I] n Toqueville's day, this was called tyranny.
Nowadays ... it is called the separation of church and state.20
When the representatives of the people have decided, for example,
that no one should possess hallucinogenic drugs, a religious group's
insistence on using them for religious purposes becomes unprotected
deviance. The civil society says to believers: "[N]o problem! Get a
new God! And through all of this trivializing rhetoric runs the subtle
but unmistakable message: Pray if you like, worship if you must,
but whatever you do, do not on any account take your religion
seriously."2'
And, third, a modern American academic liberal should care about
religion because democracy would not be democracy unless it made
space for all available voices, including religious voices, including sub-
versive religions voices. "[D]emocracy needs its nose-thumbers....
[T] hey play important roles in the proper function of the republic."22
Here he again invokes Alexis de Toqueville, who said that unless reli-
gion makes a claim on public attention, the state will fill the vacuum.
(And who would have known better about vacuums the state can fill
than an observant early nineteenth century Frenchman?) This argu-
ment, Carter says, is "a staple of political science." It "flows from the
nature (and the dangers) of popular democracy as a form of govern-
ance."23 As I tried to show above, however, he sometimes argues that
religious argument is entitled to particular attention, perhaps because
19. CARTER, supra note 1, at 56.
20. Id. at 123.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 38.
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religion is peculiarly important among associations that resist exer-
tions of state power, or perhaps because he is letting his Apostle Paul
voice slip into his liberal political argument. I will say more on that
point in a moment.
American culture condemns subversive assertions based on faith as
anti-democratic because such assertions offend against the dogma that
the only valid American religion is the religion of American democ-
racy. Thus, subversive rhetoric is more acceptable when it is not reli-
gious. Here Carter aims his criticism at several of his academic
colleagues who write on the First Amendment:
A number of theorists . . .have tried to craft rules to govern
dialogue in the public square, rules, generally, that force reli-
gious citizens to restructure their arguments in purely secular
terms.... [T] his approach might strike many religious people as
... demeaning ... in their struggles to find within their faith
communities answers to questions about the ultimate.2 4
B. The Pauline Christian Speaking in Law School
Sometimes Carter describes and honors religious struggle on the
guess that the civil society has nothing to fear from religion. With
respect to most members of his denomination and mine, the guess is
sound enough; we mainline Christians long ago stopped being much
of a threat to anybody. But sometimes, and more interestingly, he
seems to admit that there might be plenty for America to fear from
religion. Then-speaking as a believer-he seems to say that the risk
is worth the promise of civic gain. When he makes this argument,
Carter sounds like St. Paul in Athens, inviting the Athenian intelli-
gentsia to enthrone the Lord Jesus in the place they had reserved for
an unknown god.2 5 One may sharpen the point by supposing that all
of the Episcopalians and Roman Catholics in military service for the
United States took seriously the recently declared teaching of their
churches that a Christian may never use nuclear weapons. The risk
from this kind of obedience is obvious and enormous-we have been
hearing about it from the government regularly since Hiroshima-
but the gain, given that the God of Jews and Christians is the Ruler of
the universe, is greater than the risk.
I suggest here that Carter has two public voices, voices he uses in
the law school rather than in the church. In his don't-worry, aca-
demic-liberal voice, Carter says to his colleagues in the legal profes-
sion and in government: Listen to these odd people. There might be
24. Id. at 218.
25. Acts 17:22-34.
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something in what they say, and, in any case, what they say is innocu-
ous. In his the-Apostle-Paul-in-public voice, he says: Listen to me,
there might be something in what my faith teaches me. St. Paul said:
"What you worship but do not know-this is what I now proclaim."26
This latter sort of voice is unusual'in law school, but, when he uses it,
still, Carter is in law school.
"[A] religion that has survived must include some kernel of moral
truth that resonates with broader human understandings, whether or
not most people share the epistemic premises of the religion itself,"27
Carter says, and here he speaks of his own faith, as well as the faith of
the marginal religions in modern America. He looks carefully, for ex-
ample, atJustice Stevens' opinion in the Cruzan28 case: Stevens spoke
of the existence of human life as a matter of "theological or philo-
sophical conjecture," something American law cannot reach. But,
Carter says, "if life cannot be defined except in impermissibly 'sectar-
ian' terms, the state is essentially unable to act."29 Thus speaks
Carter's law-school St. Paul self: he still wants the state to be able to
act; St. Paul did, too.
II. FROM THE CHURCH
Professor Carter includes enough confessional religion in his book
to permit a more extended "ecclesioiogical" 30 analysis of the case he
makes for the political significance of belief-an analysis that looks at
liberal American disdain for religious faith not from a law-school class-
room licensing successors to the powerful, but from the church-
which educates, or claims to, by remembering, by ritual observance,
and by pondering, as well as by proclamation. One may put the ques-
tion this way: What sort of church does Carter contemplate as his
church in his long complaint about the situation of the church in
America? I see three possibilities: (1) the Gathered Church, the sort
of community of the faithful we learn about when reading about Jews
in the Middle Ages or Christians before the conversion of the em-
peror Constantine; (2) the church of Christendom, the ancestor both
of Carter's American Episcopal Church and of my American Roman
Catholic Church-and also of American Methodists, Presbyterians,
and others; and, finally, (3) the Witnessing Church.
26. Acts 17:23.
27. CARTER, supra note 1, at 231.
28. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
29. CARTER, supra note 1, at 240.
30. Ecclesiology is the branch of Christian theology that ponders what the church
(ecclesia) should be.
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A. The Gathered Church
An ancient and sometimes inevitable tradition among Jews and
Christians teaches believers to get together and then get out of the
way. The notion here is that the civil society in which each commu-
nity of the faithful exists-if only at the edge, and if only as the result
of tolerance-is irrelevant to the communal business of believers. Be-
lievers are pilgrims in the world, passers-through, "resident aliens."31
At best, the civil society is irrelevant. At worst, the civil society is cor-
rupting and destructive, and if the community of the faithful exists for
anything it exists to protect itself from secular corruption, so that it
can remember what it is, preserve its identity in teaching and in ritual
observance, perpetuate itself through educating its children, and wait
for the Lord to come back.32 Carter touches on this "sectarian" posi-
31. Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Duke University professors whose
principal work is to train ministers for the United Methodist Church, propose this theme
for adult Sunday School classes' study in Resident Aliens. STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H.
WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS (1990). The publisher appends to the title, on the front of the
paperback edition, a sort of subtitle: "A provocative Christian assessment of culture and
ministry for people who know that something is wrong." When the title and the
publisher's gloss on the title are combined, the suggestion is that what is wrong is that
Christians do not realize that they are in an American society that is not their own, that
they are strangers here. The content of the book bears out that impression, which is an
odd agenda for a denomination that has been steadfastly American, "I haven't got much
of a church," Hauerwas once said. "But what I do have in the church is a kind of normative
account.., enough shards of memory around that I can almost maintain some kind of
claim that this is better than nothing." Stanley Hauerwas et al., Faith in the Republic: A
Frances Lewis Law Center Conversation, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 467, 481 (1988); see also infra
notes 32, 37.
32. The Gathered Church, because it is cohesive and, in a word, "gathered," avoids the
sort of dispersion implied in Hauerwas's discussion, supra note 31. What holds it together
ecclesiologically is adherence to certain procedures for deliberation, as well as for worship.
JOHN H. YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM: SOCIAL ETHICS AS GOSPEL 15-45 (1984) (referring
to the chapter Yoder called "The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood"). In the absence of such a
church polity, Christians in the mainline American church, such as Hauerwas, Carter, and
I, have a hard time avoiding the conclusion that our church is part of the civil religion. We
have to locate a New Testament church for ourselves, sometimes in the local
denominational parish, but as often in other communities of the faithful-among groups
of friends, neighbors, colleagues, and family. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER,
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 196-217 (1991). In either gathering,
[tihe community of disciples formed in the power of [Jesus'] Spirit keeps
alive the dangerous memory of his life, death, and resurrection as a
promise of a future for all the defeated and the dead. In the circle of life
where Christ's way is followed, a new possibility of shalom, of redemptive
wholeness, is made experientially available and can be tested in
anticipation, even now, as the struggle of history goes on. . . . The
community of disciples is charged with keeping alive throughout the ages
the good news let loose in the struggling world through the history and
destiny of Jesus of Nazareth.
ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, SHE WHO Is: THE MYSTERY OF GOD IN FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL Dis-
COURSE 151, 156 (1993).
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tion3 3 now and again, as when he complains about religious entangle-
ments with the state that weaken the church.
Communities of Jews have often gathered in this way, frequently
because they could see that they would not survive at all if they did not
gather together and get out of the way. Communities of Christians
were like this before Constantine.3 4 No doubt some communities of
Christians preserved this sort of distinct separation during the long
centuries between Constantine and the Reformation. And some
groups of reformed Christians have established and preserved such
communities from the sixteenth century until today.35
The evident historical fact about sectarian believers is that they are
tortured and killed, usually by mainline believers. Members of these
communities have been slaughtered, from their earliest beginnings; in
every century, whole communities of them have been wiped out.36
American law and civil practice now extend "tolerance," in Carter's
pejorative sense of the word, to them: America does not, for example,
demand that the sons of sectarians serve in the armed forces; it allows
them to have their own schools and excepts them from mandatory
school attendance laws; it sometimes tolerates their aversion to
automobiles and photographs. Occasionally, American popular cul-
ture holds them up to romantic wondermeit, as when Garrison Keil-
lor tells stories about the Sanctified Brethren from whom he came, or
when Hollywood makes a movie out of one of Chaim Potok's novels,
or attempts an ambiguous treatment of Christian pacifism.
Carter never quite gets this first vision of the church clear. He
sometimes recognizes that the church might have a vision of itself as
distinct and that this vision might lead to a distinct kind of politics.37 I
infer this perception, for example, from his observation that President
Reagan was not "religious" in a way that is important for analysis:
"Reagan ... placed a low value on the process of discerning, in com-
pany with others of the same faith, the will of God. ' '38 But mostly
when Carter talks about the church, the Gathered Church is out of his
view. For example, he defines "religion" -surely a key definition in
this book, and, incidentally, a defense of the sort of believer Carter
33. For my discussion of the meaning of "sectarian" and an attempt to apply it to
religiously affiliated law schools, see Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in
Religiously Affiliated American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1859 (1993).
34. See YODER, supra note 32, at 135-47.
35. Id.
36. SeeJ. DENNY WEAVER, BECOMING ANABAPrisT (1987); Harold S. Bender, Mennonites,
in 15 COLLIER's ENC C'LOPEDIA 694-95 (1965).
37. Cf Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 15.
38. CARTER, supra note 1, at 98.
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says President Reagan is-as "the belief in supernatural intervention
in human affairs."39
A religious Jew or a disciple of the Gathered Church would proba-
bly say that belief in supernatural intervention is, of course, part of
what her group's religion is about; however, she would likely complain
that the definition treats religion as political only in the liberal-demo-
cratic sense, because it confines the meaning of the word to personal
belief and does not include the fact that religion is hermeneutical, 40
dynamic, and-something Carter elsewhere documents well-com-
munal. Religion, for the people of the Gathered Church, is a congre-
gational process. The preservation of religion, for them, depends on
the faithful observance of ways of perceiving in order to act-what the
theologians call praxis.4 1 Such ways are detailed in the Talmud and the
Pauline epistles, in rules for monastic living and for congregational
discourse, and in the ritual practices and curious personal canons of
morality that Carter treats, to be sure-though he treats them mostly
as a liberal democratic ruler would. The issue such practices raise, as
he sees it, is accommodation by the state.
To be fair, I need to note that while he neglects the hermeneutical
and the dynamic, Carter does not neglect the communal character of
religion. For example, he says:
A religion... is not simply a means for understanding one's self
... [but is] a way of denying the authority of the rest of the
world; it is a way of saying to fellow human beings and to the
state those fellow humans have erected, "No, I will not accede to
your will." 42
That notion seems to imply a choice between communities. But when
he considers religion as communal, he does not do so from the
church, but from the law school. The religious dissent he celebrates
is, as he says, learned and practiced and preserved in a community,
but he seems to value communal dissent only because it is instrumen-
tal for the liberal-democratic enterprise.
I want to dispute this point of view. Although the dissent of the
Gathered Church may, as Carter argues rather too much, serve a par-
ticular governmental purpose in America, it is hard to accept that it
39. Id. at 25.
40. I understand "hermeneutics" to raise the question of point of view-that is, what a
reader or group of readers brings to a text, as distinguished from what is seen to be in the
text. As Hauerwas and Yoder use the term, it describes communal point of view, a process
in the church, prototypically a process in the Gathered Church, but also the process in the
Witnessing Church that is prior to witness. See generally HAUERWAS, supra note 18; YODER,
supra note 32.
41. Praxis is a Greek word meaning "practice."
42. CARTER, supra note 1, at 41.
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serves governmental purposes in general 43 or that it is present to serve
governmental purposes as a matter of liberal-democratic political
principle. For the liberal enterprise, Carter's celebration of religious
dissent is like the argument Justice Holmes made for Mephistophe-
les-"keeps the green scum off the pond."44 If Carter would look in-
stead at what the Gathered Church thinks about itself he might
conclude that it is not fundamentally interested in acknowledging or
preserving whatever value liberals think it has for America. Funda-
mentally, it is not even interested in whether or not America accom-
modates it.45
B. The Church of Christendom
Carter, like most Christians in America, is an heir of Christendom,
of a civil order that was not pluralistic and in which the state itself
claimed to be a Christian institution. (One of the titles of the sover-
eign in the United Kingdom is still "Defender of the Faith.") The
church of Christendom-for example, Carter's ecclesiastical cousin,
the Church of England, and historically the Roman Catholic
Church-was a part, though only a part, of a Christian civil order.
The Talmud imagines such a religious civil order for Jews, as it remem-
bers biblical Israel. Lots of medieval ink was spilled on elaborating
43. The Gathered Church insists on the soundness of its public statements, when it
makes them, based on premises that are neither sought nor located in civil sources. Walter
Rauschenbusch referred to this fact, and he had unwarranted optimism for it, when he
said: "It is faith to assert the feasibility of a fairly righteous and fraternal social order...
the proposition that fairness, kindness, and fraternity will work." WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH,
A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 102 (Abingdon ed., 1978) (1917). Timothy P.
Jackson stands in this tradition when he argues that charity should be prior to justice in
American public policy:. "The good society, unthreatened by the diversity of its members,
requires neither veils of ignorance nor bread and circuses. Such citizens [Jews and
Christians] are the sort of moral revolutionaries who, if welcomed, would make for political
stability in a free state." But Jackson has less optimism than Rauschenbusch had: "They
seldom are welcomed." Timothy P. Jackson, Liberalism and Agape: The Priority of Charity to
Democracy and Philosophy, 1993 ANN. Soc'Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 47, 47.
The difference I suggest between the Gathered Church and the Witnessing Church is to
some extent captured by the relative optimism in these two statements for what I think is
the same Christian witness. They also differ historically and sociologically, in that the
Gathered Church, as manifested-for example, in Anabaptist denominations in
America-has tended to opt out of civil affairs, and the Witnessing Church, as a relatively
modern set of factions within the mainline church in America, tends to wade in. John
Howard Yoder implied the distinction in what I take to be an argument to Anabaptists that
they should wade in more than they have. JOHN H. YODER, THE CHRISTIAN WITNESS TO THE
STATE (1964); see supra notes 31, 32.
44. Holmes made this observation in his letter to Lady Pollock of February 21, 1909. I
THE POLLOCK-HOLMES LETrERS 147 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1942).
45. See Stanley Hauerwas' discussion of "The Use of the Law: A Summary Statement," a
position adopted by the Mennonite Church General Assembly in 1981. HAUERWAS, supra
note 18, at 74-87.
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both a Christian theology and a legal order for another, real version,
as in the "Holy Roman Empire" or the politics of Dante's Divine
Comedy.
One still hears the civic virtues of Christendom advanced as an ar-
gument for what the church in the modern United States should be.
Such a vision is probably behind the lingering pressure for Christian
Bible-reading and prayer in public places, and, depending how you
look at it, sectarian irrationality or curricular fairness in the way pub-
lic-school teachers account for the origins of the world. The vision
shows up in the arguments, from a number of quarters, that the Dec-
laration of Independence is a religious document, and that a nonde-
nominational Christian political consensus still exists in America.46
The church of Christendom is in service to the civil order, but it
need not worry about the state's becoming an idol, because the state
itself is Christian. Carter calls on the ecclesiology of Christendom
when he complains about those who complain about politicians who
advance their views of what God wants, about the clergy's occasional
practice of backing or, more often, opposing candidates for political
office, and about voters marking their ballots according to the reli-
gious views of candidates. 47 His substantive argument is that out-
comes in such situations, and decisions by legislators and judges,
should be based on the liberal-democratic utilitarian value of the pro-
positions or candidates advanced, not on approval or disapproval of
the religious reasons for advancing them. He rightly notes that the
complaints are rarely made when religion backs liberal causes, such as
the Civil Rights Movement: "There is much distressing evidence that
the religious voice is required to stay out of the public square only
when it is pressed in a conservative cause," such as the regulation of
abortion.48 His procedural argument is that proponents of religious
causes in liberal politics have a moral right to be listened to when they
say what it allows them to say.
This moral right is not only a right to speak out, but also a right to
audience. Because the church of Christendom serves the civil order
and the state-in everything from rolling bandages and blessing tanks
to maintaining hospitals and centers for the homeless-the state must
fairly reciprocate by attending when the church addresses it. As
Carter says it, "God is asked to bless the nation, its people, and its
46. See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
(1991); Robert E. Rodes,Jr., Pluralist Christendom and the Christian Civil Magistrate, 8 CAP. U.
L. REv. 413 (1979). The former is the final volume in Rodes' three-volume study of
English Christendom (1977-1991).
47. See CARTER, supra note 1, at 44-66.
48. Id. at 64.
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leaders. But nobody, in the civil religion, is asked to do anything for
God."49 He asserts that the historical and philosophical justification
for the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment was to underwrite
such a claim for attention: "iT] he principal task of the separation of
church and state is to secure religious liberty,"50 and the liberty being
secured is a liberty within which and from which the church can speak
to and as part of the republican community.
[W]hat is most vital... is to avoid the historical conclusion that
its principal purpose is to protect the secular from the religious,
an approach that, perhaps inevitably, carries us down the road
toward a new establishment, the establishment of religion as a
hobby, trivial and unimportant for serious people, not to be
mentioned in serious discourse. 51
The ecclesiology of Christendom poses dangers for those who are
both citizens and believers, and, even more, for the civil and religious
communities to which they belong. The danger that the liberal quar-
ter most often cites-and Carter is relentless in discounting it-is the
eighteenth-century fear that organized religion will take over the state
and impose its orthodoxy on everybody. 52 The most potent counter
49. Id. at 52.
50. Id. at 107.
51. Id. at 115. This "trivialization" is, of course, the result of a deeper development in
which American Christendom tries to relate to God through the state. See Hauerwas &
Baxter, supra note 15, at 118-19.
52. Both Carter and I tend to discount this possibility. The Anabaptists are less
sanguine because their church is more potent and because it remembers what
Christendom does to the Gathered Church. Yoder accuses mainline liberals like Carter
and me of beginning the history of the matter in the middle:
I would try to be more of an historian, asking where the defensiveness came
from that is now being overdone .... It is not that anybody important
wanted to keep elite neo-conservatives like Neuhaus [see supra note 10] from
living their faith in the public square. It is that old-fashioned conservatives
thought that the only way for them to act in the public square was to
exclude the Jews and the Quakers. Don't complain about overdoing the
secularization without recognizing that it was the natural response
(overdone, as anything is when made legal) of victims to the dominion of
the Erastians [that is, of the church of Christendom].... The reason we got
into the box where assertions based on faith are especially constricted is the
long history of people who made assertions based on faith coercively.
Failure to "make space for all available options" was invented not by the
American Civil Liberties Union but by the Erastians....
Yoder Memorandum, supra note 7.
Nor is this development entirely a historical one:
Part of the problematic you get into if you are not satisfied with "hobby"
status is that somebody has to get into the business of accrediting which are
the entities that qualify for the status of non-hobby religions with rights to a
place on the podium. If native Americans smoking peyote, how about the
Klan burning crosses? Scieniology? A mail-order degree mill issuing certifi-
cates of ordination?
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to that fear, just now, is the fact of organized religion's manifest weak-
ness, and of its consistent inability, in America, to agree on much of
anything.
Carter adds to this assessment of weakness an interesting sort of
chicken-soup extension: What harm would it do to try it?
[T]here is reason to doubt that more harm to individual free-
dom necessarily occurs when a religion seeks to impose its vision
of the good life than when an entirely secular political move-
ment does it .... It is not easy to understand why the risk that
the religions might try to impose on secular society their reli-
gious visions of the good life is more to be avoided than the risk
that the state and its powerful constituents might try to impose
on the religions a secular vision of the good life. 5
3
I think of the visit to the White House of President Bush's Episcopal
bishop, a visit in which the Bishop told the President that the Gulf
War was immoral, which meant, I suppose, that Christians such as the
President should have nothing to do with it. And then-Carter's
point-I think of who won the argument.
The greater danger is theological-that the church of Christen-
dom, which has a relatively low risk of producing martyrs, will become
more American than Christian. I think, on this point, not of Carter's
church, nor even of Dr. Jerry Falwell's, but of my own, and of Walker
Percy's fictional description of an American Catholic Church that has
moved its central offices from Vatican City to Peoria, Illinois, and has
adopted the practice of playing "The Star Spangled Banner" at the
elevation of the host at mass.5 4 The lesson of the history of the church
of Christendom is that it becomes what Malcomb Boyd calls chaplain
Id. This last point is also the argument of Stanley Hauerwas against a Christian endorse-
ment of freedom of religion-not that either he or Yoder is particularly in fear of the Ku
Klux Klan et al., but that they do not want the church to be subject to accreditation from
outside the church. HAUERWAS, supra note 6, at 69-92.
53. CARTER, supra note 1, at 145; see also Yoder Memorandum, supra note 7 ("A religion
or a faith which coerces when it can is categorically a different animal from one whose very
commitment rejects coercion. This is more than an ethical difference; it is a difference of
Gods."). The difference has implications for Christendom that are not a problem of the
Gathered Church and, when it is careful, not a problem of the Witnessing Church either:
When a secular power-bearer claims to be saving me he has to give reasons
the whole polity can understand and vote on. He does not call on God to
quiet his opposition. The secularist can be called to account. So can the
theist who accepts the pluralistic polity [of either the civil religion or
Christendom]. But not the theist who excludes his or her adversary from
the hermeneutical circle. If I am the excluded adversary, I don't like the
oppression. If I am a theologian, I don't like the abuse of the name of God.
Id.
54. 1 have developed this argument and my use of Percy's two novels, Love in the Ruins
and The Thanatos Syndrome. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Church and the Law, in RADICAL
CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER: A FESTSCHRIFT HONORING WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW
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to the status quo. Historically, the Erastian notion of what the church
should be, particularly in Britain and the United States, has produced
a church that hardly ever dissents from what the secular powers of the
state want to do. The honored dead entombed in its churches are the
heroes of the state-soldiers mostly.
Still, the church of Christendom has dissented occasionally, and a
champion of this ecclesiology, as perhaps Carter is, can always fairly
say that the history of religion in the West is nowhere a history of
steadfastly standing up to princes. "No religion always challenges the
state's imposed meanings," as he says, "and few do it very often."55
C. The Witnessing Church
The Bishop's visit to the White House could symbolize a third eccle-
siology, one that yearns for the theological consistency of the Gath-
ered Church but at the same time believes that it is good for the
church to influence princes. 56 The Witnessing Church begins in
church-the Bishop did not arrive at his view of the Gulf War only by
listening to the six o'clock news or reading about debates in Congress.
He arrived at his view by asking, listening, reading, pondering among
the faithful, among people who might have begun their deliberations
with a prayer, who were conscious of their theology (that is, of the
memory of the church), who read and pondered Scripture, and who
were therefore able to say, with St. James,5 7 that they and the Holy
Spirit had come to a conclusion about the war.
The Bishop was, to this point, living and thinking as if he were in
the Gathered Church, but then he went out from the church and
joined the pickets at the White House. And, because he had influ-
ence-influence as the Christian brother of the President-he was
invited in and he got a chance to, as we believers sometimes put it,
"bear witness" to what America (as in "God Bless America") should be
doing. The Bishop did not then come from the church of Christen-
dom, but from the church bearing witness to the state on the church's
terms, using theological argument formulated not in the public square
but among the faithful-behind the wall, as Walter Brueggemann
(Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., forthcoming 1995); Shaffer, supra in 1994 ANN., CATH.
COMM'N ON INTELL. & CULTURAL AFF. 107.
55. CARTER, supra note 1, at 272-73.
56. A classic theological source is MARTIN LUTHER, Secular Authority: To What Extent It
Should Be Obeyed, in MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM His WRITINGS 228-73 (John
Dillenberger ed., 1961), a letter of January 1523 addressed to the Duke of Saxony. See
GERHARD EBELING, LUTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO His THOUGHT 175-91 (1977).
57. Acts 15:28.
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puts it.58 The Bishop came from the church, from a witnessing
church that could claim continuitywith, say, Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Thomas More, Catherine of Siena, and the Christian martyrs of mod-
ern El Salvador. Bonhoeffer, More, and Catherine all had power, as
well as influence, but one thing about their Witnessing Church is that
it sought goodness in politics more than it sought power for itself.
"Fighting for an end to the production of nuclear weapons," as Carter
puts it, "is not the same as fighting for official recognition of the ex-
clusivity of one's faith."59
The Witnessing Church is like the church of Christendom, though,
in that it does not disdain influence.60 It claims influence; it even
fashions its arguments-such as the pastoral advice, from virtually all
mainline denominations, against nuclear weapons-so that they will
be heard and understood by nonbelievers as well as believers. Carter
sometimes writes as a member of such a church, claiming audience as
the Bishop did at the White House: "The [religious] group ... will
often be engaged in ... acts of resistance ... interposing the group
judgment against the judgment of a larger society. Worshipping to-
gether, endeavoring jointly to discern the will of God, if honestly
done, will lead frequently to that result."61 Such witness does not
shrink from the possibility of influence, even when, as Carter warns,
the witness the Church undertakes and recommends to believers in-
vites tyranny: Tyrants kill people to keep people quiet. Tyrants give
martyrs to the Witnessing Church.
Carter doesn't always sound like this. He also writes as a liberal. In
the sentence that follows what I quoted just above, for example, he
says, "When the state tries to block that process of discernment in a
faith community, it is acting tyrannically by removing potential
sources of authority and meaning different from itself."62 When he
writes in his liberal mood, his membership in the church appears to
be irrelevant to what he wants to say; he appears to be most interested
in the preservation of America, an America that is not tyrannical, in
this case. Another example is what he says about legislated prayer for
the public schools: "The dynamics of the classroom should matter to
the Court ... but the motivation of the legislators should be irrele-
vant."63 Here, again, the result in the civil religion seems to be what is
58. WALTER BRUEGGEMANN, INTERPRETATION AND OBEDIENCE: FROM FAITHFUL READING
TO FAITHFUL LIVING 41-69 (1991).
59. CARTER, supra note 1, at 91.
60. My friend and colleague Yoder argues with a distinction that turns on influence.
See supra note 40.
61. CARTER, supra note 1, at 142.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 191.
16171994]
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
important to him, rather than the witness of the church to the public
schools.
The problem with Carter's liberal64 mood in such an ambitious and
timely book is that it is, in its ecclesiology, ambivalent. Particularly in
a book written by a lawyer, such a mood will almost always lead to an
issue about the state's regulation of religion: "The question crying out
most vitally for resolution, given the presence of religions in the pub-
lic square, is whether and how to regulate that presence." 65 When
that agenda is announced, the Gathered Church, which does not allow
the state to regulate its presence, will gather itself somewhere beyond
the public square and ask to be left alone. And the Witnessing
Church had best retire behind the wall and insist on conducting its
business in its own space and its own language and on coming to the
public square with a prepared text.66 When that happens-and it may
have happened in America a long time ago-my hope for Christian
lawyers such as Carter is that they will leave the public square and go
to church.
Professor Carter argues, first, that religious argument is as worthy of
notice as any other kind:
Liberal theory might scoff at the idea that God's will is relevant
to moral decisions in the liberal state, but the citizen whose pub-
lic self is guided by religious faith might reasonably ask why the
will of any of the brilliant philosophers of the liberal tradition,
or, for that matter, the will of the Supreme Court of the United
States is more relevant to moral decisions than the will of God.
So far, liberal theory has not presented an adequate answer.67
Next, he argues that American society should not require religious
argument-as the price of making a moral claim for audience-to be
cast in the language of democratic politics. Religious argument
should not be made subject to "a set of conversational rules that re-
quire the individual whose religious tradition makes demands on his
or her moral conscience to reformulate that conscience-to destroy a
64. For a discussion of Carter's definition of "liberal," see supra note 17.
65. CARTER, supra note 1, at 101.
66. Yoder argues for translation:
I am not sure that the believers should be obligated to make their moral
claim in secular language, but neither should they have a right to a
government-subsidized interpreter if they insist on doing it in Yiddish. If
we really seek "the peace of the city," why should we fear that by saying our
message in Babylonian we would have to destroy its meaning. . . . Why
should we not be able to translate?
Yoder Memorandum, supra note 7; see also YODER, supra note 32, at 160-66.
67. CARTER, supra note 1, at 226.
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vital aspect of the self-in order to gain the right to participate in the
dialogue alongside other citizens."68
Carter makes these arguments in two moods. One mood, which I
imagine Carter announcing in his and my law-school world, would re-
store religion to American culture. This restoration could happen in
alternative ways: (1) either America is in some significant way a Chris-
tian, or Judeo-Christian, culture, and religion in America is the
church of Christendom; or (2) Christendom is long gone and religion
should be admitted to the public square as an equal player in the
game of liberal-democratic politics, as Richard John Neuhaus has ar-
gued.69 Either way, Carter's agenda is in large part a "church-state"
agenda; it sees the church as subservient to democratic civil order,
and that means as subject to the centralized power of the modern
democratic nation-state. The problems for lawyers to discuss are then
problems about what the state should do with the church, as if reli-
gion were an intruder on a secular political arrangement-even, as
Carter suggests, a resister and a subversive intruder. If a person is
interested in the first agenda of Carter's, this law-school agenda, it is
as a citizen.
In his other mood, Carter speaks as a member-of the community of
the faithful-as a Christian in the church. We who are interested in
this second mood are interested as religious people; the problems in
which we are interested concern what the church should do about the
state. Or, more accurately, because the state has lethal power, be-
cause the state is, as St. Paul said, a thing of "authorities and
potentates," 70 the problems have to do with whether the state should
be a serious concern for the church at all, or whether it is as morally
inert as the weather.71
68. Id. at 229.
69. NEUHAUS, supra note 10.
70. Ephesians 6:12.
71. The weather metaphor is one upon which Hauerwas and I once agreed. Hauerwas
et al., supra note 31, at 484. "Ijust live here and it's God's state," Hauerwas said. Id. at 483.
Yoder argues with the metaphor:
I agree that my primary frame of reference is the people of God, but it does
not follow that I have no concern for the civil society. That concern is
derivative but it is real. I'd rather have one where potholes got fixed than
one where they don't. I'd rather have one where Jews and Amish are free
to live than when they don't. . . . One can change government; the
religiously farthest out of the [Founding] Fathers, Roger Williams and
William Penn, did the most to make the American polity viable. One can
change government best if one is most independent of it. The position
which cannot change government is the Erastian [the church of
Christendom].
Yoder Memorandum, supra note 7. From a somewhat more Roman Catholic perspective,
my friend and colleague Gerald Bradley argues, in a memorandum addressed to a draft of
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There is a distinction between what the community of the faithful,
gathered for supper to begin the Sabbath, in temple, in church hall,
in law-school lounge, at the kitchen table, or in the living room, has to
think and do, and what is useful to twentieth-century American de-
mocracy. Carter is willing to countenance the religious deliberation
and proclamation that will come from a gathering of the faithful, but
he never quite faces up to the fact that religious witness, when it is as
religious as Jews and Christians have tried to be when they have really
tried, is costly.
If religion 72 in this sense, and not as a hobby, gains the space Carter
seeks as its proper place in America, the dissonance will be deafening.
The community of the faithful, and each community of faithful peo-
ple, might then have to decide-as few do now-what it is to do in
American society, or better, what it is. The price of witness, if the
this review, that Hauerwas and I are mistaken when we equate government and coercion.
Memorandum from Gerald Bradley, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame, to
Thomas L. Shaffer, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame (Dec. 11, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Bradley Memorandum] (on file with author). Hauerwas says, "Law is in service to poli-
tics." Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Politics and the Practice of Law in a World Without
Foundations, 44 MERCER L. REv. 743, 748 (1993). His and my theology of the Cross sees the
Crucifixion as a consequence ofJesus' confronting the law. HAUERWAS, supra note 6, at 179
n.25. Hauerwas and Baxter argue that Christians should not even attempt to formulate
jurisprudence, because any rationale for law becomes a basis for violence and exclusion.
Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 15, at 124-25. Bradley says that this is
not true in practice and an insurmountable obstacle to good clear thinking
about law. I know that.., it's quite fashionable among the law-and-religion
crowd, but still I would insist that the value of all rules, including law, is
basically independent of any and all enforcement efforts (successful or
not).
Bradley Memorandum, supra. That would be significant, but it would still leave open the
question of whether law, excised from coercion, might be an idol. SHAFFER & SHAFFER,
supra note 32.
72. Both Yoder and Milner Ball, reflecting the theology of Karl Barth, complain about
the way that Carter and I use the word "religion." See MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE
LAw (1993); Yoder Memorandum, supra note 7. The most radical side of this argument
says that Christianity and Judaism are not religions at all. Yoder does not say that, but he
insists that distinctions have to be made between one kind of religion and another,
allowing that the word can be used forJudaism and Christianity. Still, Carter and I have a
certain settled cultural basis for the broad (if imprecise) way in which we use the word. I
think of what G.K. Chesterton said about Francis Thompson's poetry:
[T]here certainly was and is a certain thing, to which our fathers found it
more practical to attach and limit the name of religion.... [T] hey were...
certain of what things were not religious, including much that modern
moralists call a wider religious life .... What we mean when we say that
"The Hound of Heaven" is a real religious poem, is simply that it would
make no sense, if we supposed it to refer to any of these modern
abstractions, or to anything but a personal Creator in relation to a personal
creature.
G. K. Chesterton, Introduction to FRANCIS THOMPSON, THE HOUND OF HEAVEN AND OTHER
POEMS 5, 5-6 (1936). That, for present purposes, then and now, is sufficient.
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community is faithful, will be high, and the price of gathering may
be.73 There are two agendas here, not one. The first and safer
agenda is not really religious at all. It would return America to the
grand claim made by our forefathers-few were foremothers-that
America is "God's New Israel," a city on a hill, the righteous empire.
The other agenda is religious. It invokes the manifest history of Israel,
the Suffering Servant of God, and of the Cross, as symbols of what
people do to one another in the name of the law.
73. The enterprise is not as much a matter either of decent civility, or of making
pluralism work, as Carter and Professor MichaelJ. Perry, in another recent and important
treatise on this subject, think it is. See MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). Perry writes:
[T]he main question . . . is the proper role, if any, of religious-moral
discourse in the politics of a religiously and morally pluralistic society ....
If religious-moral discourse should not be excluded from "the public
square," how should it be included? In particular, how should such
discourse be brought to bear in the practice of political justification? The
serious challenge ... is to define a middle ground between, on the one
side, [those] ... who would largely exclude religious-moral discourse from
the political-justificatory practice and, on the other side, the position of
those who would bring religious-moral discourse to bear in a sectarian,
divisive way.
Id. at 5.
I quote Perry at this length because I suspect that he deals with the issue with which
Carter, when he is in his academic liberal mood, deals as well. Perhaps Perry states the
academic-liberal issue more clearly than Carter does, but in doing so, he limits it so much
that I conclude-as I do not conclude from what Carter has done-that Perry's issue is not
interesting for the church.
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